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Abstract 
 The general characteristic of the foreign policy adopted by Turkey for 
North Iraq has been shaped based on the national integrity of Iraq since the 
Gulf War4. However developments in this country caused an increase in 
seperation demands from North Iraq Kurds. On the other hand this region 
had become an important base for Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) since 
1980’s. Turkey’s security dilemma and priorities over Iraq were formulated 
as “red lines” and decleraded before invasion of Iraq. But North Iraq based 
security issues increased after the occupation of Iraq by the United States of 
America (USA). Getting support of the USA Iraqi Kurds began to follow a 
policy as political rival of Turkey. But economic relations, which have been 
established with the regional Government in terms of energy and trade, 
caused cooperation in other fields. So transfomation of bilateral relations of 
Turkey and Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq (KRGI) is discussed in 
this paper. Aim of this paper is to analyze how economic cooperation caused 
cooperation in security issues such as fight against terrorism. 
 
Keywords: Northern Iraq, Turkish Foreign Policy, National Security Issues, 
Economic Cooperation 
 
Introduction 
 Turkey is a an important regional actor with its 75 million population 
in the regions such as Middle East, Balkans and the Caucasus. Historical and 
geopolitical realities force Turkey to follow active foreign policy in these 
regions. From the historical perspective Turkey has close links with these 
                                                          
4 The war that was forced Iraq  to end occupation of Kuwait by the coalition under the USA 
leadership in 1991. 
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regions inhabited from Ottomans. On the other hand Turkey is located just at 
the center of Afro Eurasia geography so developments in these regions 
directly affect Turkey. After the Cold War Turkey had to reshape its foreign 
and security policies towards the crisis such as Bosnia, Nagorno Karabakh 
etc. In this paper Northern Iraq dimension of Turkey’s foreign policy will be 
discussed. 
 Within the period from the establishment of autonomous regime in 
1992 to our day, Turkey’s Northern Iraq policy is grouped in three periods. 
Between 1992 and 2003, which is the first period, Turkey followed a 
security based policy in the area. This policy had two important strategic 
goals: destructing PKK settlement in the area and protecting the territorial 
integrity of Iraq. However, there is a point to emphasize here, both PKK’s 
settlement becoming stonger in the area and the emergence of the danger of 
separation for Iraq were a “consequent” result of the activities of the 
“combined task force” that was settled in South of Turkey with the demand 
of Ankara. Allowing the deployment of the combined task force in the 
country for humanitarian reasons protected Kurds from the attacks of 
Saddam on the one hand while paving the way for an actual power 
settlement in the region on the other hand. However, Turkey increased its 
military and political power in the area for the sake of fighting PKK. After 
taking the area under control, Ankara tried to restrain the independence 
demands of Kurdish leaders in the area on the one hand, while at the same 
time developing common policies with Baghdad, Tehran and Damascus for 
this purpose.  
 This Northern Iraq policy of Turkey, which was carried out on a 
delicate balance, collapsed with the invasion of Iraq by the USA in 2003 and 
a new period started in Turkey’s Northern Iraq policy. Due to their role 
within the invasion process, Kurds became the USA’s closest ally in Iraq and 
thus they achieved important gains after the war. In addition, one of the most 
important crises in the recent period occured in Turkish-American relations 
and consequently Turkey’s military and political influence in Northern Iraq 
diminished gradually. However, Turkey’s trading activities in Northern Iraq 
increased in this period and an economic dependence formed between 
Ankara and Erbil (administration center of Kurdish Regional Goverment of 
Iraq (KRGI)),  as a result of this.  
 The third period started in 2008 in Turkey’s Northern Iraq policy 
with the changes in the USA’s Iraq policy and the decision to reorganize the 
bilateral relations by Ankara and Erbil. In this period, the economic and 
trading cooperation between Turkey and KRGI also began to be seen in the 
areas of defence and politics. Ankara and Erbil reached an agreement about 
fighting terrorist organizations such as PKK and Iraq and Leviethan State 
(ILS). The cooperation between Ankara and Erbil in some areas, mainly 
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energy, began to bother Baghdad. The main theme of the study is to analyze 
the transformation of Turkey’s Northern Iraq policy within the period after 
invasion, the outline of which is given above.  
 
Theoretical Framework: Conceptual Discussions About National 
Security Problems 
 Realism and political liberalism, which are the two important 
paradigms of international relations discipline, approach international 
security problems from different perspectives, like they approach many other 
subjects. Also it must be mentioned here that debates between these two 
schools caused emergence of international relations as a new dicipline (see 
Eralp, 57-89: 2000). The logic behind these two schools’ analyzing 
international politics goes back to Grotian/Kantian and 
Hobbesian/Machiavellist traditions (Eralp, 2000:58). Authors such as 
Hobbes, Machievelli and Rousseau, who prepared the substructure for realist 
thinking claimed that “nations try to provide their security at the expense of 
their neighbours” and that “international relations are power struggle”. 
According to classical realists such as H.Carr and H.Morgenthau, since it is 
not possible to ensure a permanent peace in a Kantian sense, “what nations 
can do is to try to balance the power of other nations in order to prevent one 
nation from gaining full hegemony”. According to neo realist authors such as 
K.Waltz and J.Mearsheimer, to a great extent, security problems among 
nations are caused by the “anarchical” structure that is always present in the 
international system. Cooperation between nations can only exist in a limited 
way, competition resulting from security problems define this limit. A real 
long term peace or a world in which nations do not compete for power is 
impossible (Baylis, 2008: 71-72). 
 Classical realists have stated that the basic factors which influence 
the foreign policy of nations are “national interest” and “security problems”. 
Realists, who define the sum of individuals’ security as national security, 
have associated security problems with military power, especially in studies 
they conducted in the period of Cold War. If an issue was not about “military 
power”, then they tended not to see it as a “security problem” (Tanrısever, 
2005: 109-110). According to this perspective, maintaining security and 
fulfilling national interests could be possible only through military power. 
Realists considered having military power and increasing military power 
capacity, even using this capacity if needed, as a significant strategic target. 
This approach, which considered the state as the primary actor, advocated 
the determination of security policies in line with military strategies and 
claimed that security against potential threats could only be ensured through 
military power (Bakan, 2007: 39). This importance placed on security 
problems by realists can be understood from their naming this issue as high 
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politics and every other issue, including economic issues, as low politics. It 
should also be emphasized that realists consider international relations as 
“zerosum game”. According to this claim, which is also analyzed by game 
theoreticians, the gain of one side means the loss of the other side because 
interests of nations are in conflict with each other rather than being in 
harmony (Mearsheimer, 2002: 25). Realist approach bases the reason of 
conflicts between nations on reasons such as power increase between 
independent political units or search for security. According to this group, 
peace which emerges as a result of the settlement of the tension is possible. 
However, this situation does not mean that there is no international 
competition. Peace is only secured through the balance of power system that 
occurs when the expansionist policies of one side are restrained by the 
opposite side (Tellis, 2006-07: 3). 
 Thoughts which are contrary to the views of realism about 
international affairs and international security, which have shortly been 
mentioned above, have been suggested by Political Liberals who are also 
known as Idealists. Theories such as transnationalism, interdependence, 
pluralism and multilateralism, which are influenced by idealism, have also 
made claims about this issue, which are similar to the views of liberalism. 
These theories point out that non-state actors also influence international 
politics and they approach the issue of security from a different perspective. 
Economic and social issues have become vital like global security problems. 
Like conflict, cooperation can also come to the forefront in international 
relations. Especially in the event of the emergence of an interdependence 
relation, joint interests cause nations to come together. Hence, cooperation 
between nations cause the emergence of prosperity and stability in the 
international system. Transnationalists/liberals claim that nations do not act 
by applying “power policy” only in accordance with their national interests. 
In addition, unlike realists, liberalists advocate that international policy 
issues cannot be simply grouped in two as “high” and “low” importance. 
Liberals accept that issues such as military power and national security, 
which are called high policy by realists, are undoubtedly vital issues in 
international arena. However, according to liberals, just like security issues, 
economic, social and environmental issues are also “vital” (Rana, 2015: 
291). 
 According to transnationalism, general characteristics of international 
relations are in fact more prone to cooperation than conflict. Widespread 
democratic governance and values and increase in economic 
interdependency cause a decrease in international conflicts and an increase in 
long term cooperation. Thus, prevalence of democracy results with the 
spread of peace. Transnationalists state that within international law, there 
are rules that interest the nations themselves and these rules cause the 
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emergence of the law community that govern the actions of these states 
(Canestaro, 2007: 115). A great number of political scientists who have been 
influenced by the theory of liberal international relations claim that 
increasing international trade and interdependence will cause international 
peace. In fact, they developed a modern research method using quantitative 
statistical data to prove this view that goes back to classical liberal 
philosophers such as Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant. As a result of studies 
conducted with this method, they concluded that economic interdependency 
increases international peace. Statistical results about this subject prove a 
simple generalization. As a result of increase in international trade, cross 
border (in the production of specific products) specialization also increases. 
With the increasing specialization, the profit that comes from the trade and 
interdependency also deepen. Another result emerges in this case; a war 
between nations that have interdependency relations is more costly. Thus, it 
becomes difficult for nations to allocate resources for military power (Tellis, 
2006-07: 6). There are also views that the arms race, which is in the 
background of wars, will decrease or disappear in parallel with the increase 
in interdependency (Sancak, 127). The importance of construction of 
international agencies is also emphasized about ending wars. From this point 
of view, according to “Liberal theorists”, “international agencies that are 
active on a reciprocal basis can be the element of a sustainable peace.  
Although liberal theorists do not believe that it is possible for international 
agencies to eliminate war, they advocate that they can help to build stronger 
international cooperation” (Baylis, 2008: 78). Within the context of 
international law, legal obligations of nations come to light. These 
obligations also result in the emergence of law-based societies which govern 
the relations of their own nations. International law puts forward that norms 
and regimes develop and in return, nations’ sovereignty decreases 
evolutionarily in line with international legal norms. International 
cooperation, on the other hand, causes increase in universal human values 
such as justice, human rights and equality (Canestaro, 2007: 115). 
 In addition to these, integration theorists such as K.Deutsch, E.Haas 
and A.Etizoni claim that international cooperation in various areas, mainly 
economic and trading issues, will result in political integration.  Törnud 
emphasizes that integration will occur in three different levels as political, 
economic, military and communication areas. Haas states that economic and 
institutional cooperation between nations will “pave the way for peace based 
political solutions”. Haas explains this with the concept of ‘spill-over’. 
Deutsch claims that integration can occur when the political elite respond to 
demands put forward by nations and to problems that can be dealt with when 
nations act together. In response to Haas’s “spill-over” concept, Deutsch uses 
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the “take-off” concept for the process in which security society will emerge 
(cited from Canbolat, 2002: 103-107). 
 The views summarized in short above explain the transformation in 
Turkey’s Northern Iraq policy following the invasion of Iraq. So it will be 
analyzed how economic cooperation affected security issues such as fight 
against terrorism. 
 
Turkey’s Northern Iraq Policy After the Invasion of Iraq  
The Period of National Security based Northern Iraq Policy (2003-2007) 
 With the invasion of Iraq, regional balances changed in the Middle 
East and the countries in the region, mainly Turkey, developed home and 
foreign security strategies to reduce the possible problems the invasion 
would cause to a minimum level. Ankara declared its priorities against 
possible developments that may arise after the invasion as “red lines”. 
Within this period, these “red lines” constituted the basis of Turkey’s 
Northern Iraq policy. In the June and July of 2002, when the invasion was 
close, a committee that was formed by military and civilian bureaucracy 
prepared a report that would turn into action plan. Within this period, when a 
weak coalition government was ruling the country, the report which was 
prepared by bureaucrats determined a road map for Turkey during the 
impending Iraq war. In the National Security Council (NSC) in August 2002, 
the four of six important red lines emphasized in the report were about 
Northern Iraq:  
 1- Declaration of an independent Kurdish state in the North of Iraq,  
 2- Mosul and Kirkuk getting under the rule of Kurds, 
 3- A federal structure that will pave the way for independence of 
Kurds in Iraq,  
 4- Iraqi Turkmens not being a primary component of the established 
structure  
 (Taştekin, 2006: 262-263). 
 The red lines were about the constructs that would emerge in 
Northern Iraq especially after the war and the consequences of the separation 
of Iraq. Thus, having concerns about the possibility of a probable war 
disrupting the territorial integrity of Iraq, Turkey made some attempts in the 
presence of The USA, the Arab countries in the area and Iraq in order to 
prevent the invasion. These attempts had in fact started five years before the 
war. As a result of the attempts of İsmail Cem, the Foreign Affairs minister 
of the time, Neighbourhood Form was established. During the period of 
Justice and Development Party, which came to power in November 2002, 
diplomatic meetings were initiated under the name of “the meeting of Iraq’s 
neighbouring countries”. The first one was made in İstanbul on 23 January 
2003 and a consensus was reached in two important issues: 1-To make 
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diplomatic initiations in the presence of Baghdad in order to prevent the 
invasion of Iraq 2-To undertake attempts to protect the territorial integrity of 
Iraq if the war cannot be prevented.  
 However, when it was not possible to prevent the war, decisions were 
made in the subsequent meetings to “protect the territorial integrity of Iraq” 
and “to neutralize the terrorist groups in the country which were active in 
the country and which threatened the neighbouring countries”, which 
reflected the red lines of Turkey (Yeşilyurt, 2013: 405-407) 
 Turkey was concerned that KRGI would become a tempting factor 
for uneasy Kurds in Turkey or this government would directly help the 
separatist Kurds. Thus, Ankara was worried about the emergence of a fully 
independent and sovereign Kurdish state and that this state would threaten 
the countries in the region as well as the territorial integrity of Turkey. In 
fact, in 2002-2003 when the USA decided to start a military operation to 
Saddam Huseyin regime, Ankara warned Washington that the war would 
cause the emergence of an  autonomous oil-rich state or an independent 
Kurdish state. Because of these worries, TBMM did not allow USA forces to 
enter Turkish territory as a result of the voting in TBMM on 1 March 2003. 
On the other hand, Ankara started active diplomacy in the Middle East. 
Diplomatic meetings initiated by Abdullah Gül government on 23 January 
2003 would continue after the war, too. Meetings were held in Kuwait in 
February 2004 with the participation of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria. These 
countries which had similar worries with Ankara were included in a United 
Nations (UN) advisory group by the Kofi Annan secretary general of UN. 
Ankara made statements with Damascus and Tehran which supported the 
territorial integrity of Iraq and opposed the establishment of an ethnic based 
federation in Iraq   (Park, 2004: 22-23). 
 Despite Turkey’s aforementioned attempts, different alternatives 
were assessed when it became certain that the war would break out. By the 
decisions taken in NSC meeting on 27 December 2002, negotiations were 
made between G. Bush and A. Gül governments about opening of a front in 
the North of Iraq. In these negotiations, Ankara emphasized Turkey’s “red 
lines” again as prerequisites. As a result of the negotiations, a memorandum 
of understanding was signed. According to this memorandum, 60 000 
American soldiers would enter Iraq from the North and 40 000 Turkish 
soldiers would deploy in Northern Iraq to support the American troops. In 
addition, the USA would provide 6 billion dollars of financial assistance to 
Turkey (Tür, 2012: 602). Turkey’s target was to enter Kurdish dominated 
cities, disarm the Peshmerga,to prevent “demografic change” of Kirkuk and 
put an end to the quest for autonomy (Rafaat, 2007: 80). 
 Within this period, there were two different public views discussed 
on what kind of a path Turkey had to follow. According to the first view, 
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Turkey had to enter the war with USA because Turkey’s strategic interests 
necessitated this. If Turkey did not enter the war, Turkey would not be able 
to have a say in the future of Iraq, especially Northern Iraq, thus, Kurds 
would get closer to independence and Turkmens would be deprived of many 
rights. It was even asserted by some circles that Turkey could get back 
Mosul and Kirkuk in case of entering the war. The advocators of the opposite 
view moved from the thesis that the war was not related with the strategic 
interests of Turkey. In addition, this group emphasized that it was wrong for 
Turkish soldiers to be under the command of the USA and for American 
soldiers to settle in Turkey in terms of the understanding of national 
sovereignty (Tür, 2012: 601). Chief of general staff of the time, Hilmi Özkök 
summarized the reason for Turkey being out of war in short as “This is not 
our war. This is not our duty.” Özkök stated under which circumstances 
Turkey would enter a war as “1) There are the elements of Turkish army in 
Northern Iraq. An attack to these forces. 2) Depending on the developments 
of the war, emergence of a big refugee influx, 3)An instability that may occur 
as a result of the attack of one of the armed forces in the area to another or 
to a civilian...” (Hürriyet, 2003, 27 March). 
 The most important development that determined Turkey’s Northern 
Iraq policy and Turkey’s attitude in its relations with the USA was the 
rejection of March 1 motion. The motion which  rejected the claim of USA 
forces for using Turkish territory in an operation to Iraq anticipated the 
operation to be made via Turkey and the reinforcement of Turkey’s presence 
in Northern Iraq (Avcı, 2014: 7). In fact, with the rejection of the motion, it 
had been clear that Turkey’s effect on Northern Iraq, which had been under 
the supervision of Turkey during 1990s, would decrease. Thus, in order to be 
able to maintain the position in the region and to prevent any further 
breakdown in Turkish-American relations, a new motion was accepted on 20 
March 2003 which allowed the USA to use the Turkish air field (Tür, 2012: 
601). 
 In negotitations with the USA before 20 march motion, Turkey had 
laid down as a condition to send 20 000 soldiers to Northern Iraq. However, 
the USA did not approve this demand in line with the agreement with Kurdi 
groups. In other issues that Turkey was sensitive about, the USA gave a 
verbal guarantee that “Turkmens would be protected by USA and 
precautions would be taken against PKK” (Uzgel, 2013: 275). However, 20 
March motion did not help to recover Turkish-American relations, with the 
“Süleymaniye (sack) incident” about four months after this date, one of the 
most important crises occured in bilateral relations. American soliders 
attacked the Turkish Special team center in Süleymaniye with 100 
peshmergas on 4 July 2003 and detained 11 Turkish soldiers here by 
throwing a sack on their heads. After the Süleymaniye incident, the USA 
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authorities accused Turkey of sabotaging the stability in the region. Within 
this period, while there was a big chaos and anarchy in the other parts of 
Iraq, Northern Iraq was partly stable. For this reason, occupation forces had 
been deployed in the central and South parts of Iraq predominantly. 
However, American authorities showed that they were in fact disturbed by 
Turkey’s activities in the region and threatened Turkey in a way to end these 
activities (Tür, 2012: 603). Thus, it was shown that Turkey would not be 
allowed to operate in the region as it liked, like the 1990s. The USA who had 
peshmerga forces was confirming its new alliance in the region. On the other 
hand, attacks were made to institutions of Iraq Turkmen front (ITF) on 4 
March (Uzgel, 2013: 277-278). This situation showed that Turkmens were 
also among those who would pay for the 1 March motion. After the 
Süleymaniye incident, Turkey’s contact offices in the region were shut down 
and the military powers were decreased in number. Based on these 
developments, Turkey’s military and political influence in the area began to 
decrease and even to become inefficient (Uzgel, 2013: 283).   
 After this date, a negative picture had emerged in terms of the foreign 
policy Turkey wanted to keep in the region and the red lines Turkey had 
been trying to protect since 1990s. As a result of the cooperation of the USA 
with Kurds which occured as a result of the fact that they could not get what 
they wanted from Turkey, The USA armed Kurds against Saddam regime 
and kind of closed its eyes to the activities of PKK in the region, which 
influenced the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey to a great extent. Similarly, 
there occured developments which constituted the most important 
reservations of Turkey in terms of the national integrity of Iraq (Öğür et al, 
2014: 42). Not only was a self-governing state was established in Northern 
Iraq, but also a loose structured federation started in Iraq. On the other hand, 
Kurdization of Kirkuk, which was among disputable areas, became a current 
issue. Because of this during 2004, “Turkey went on making pressure to the 
USA “to limit the federalism of the future Iraqi state and the degree of 
autonomy given to any Kurdish federalist region, threatening a difficult and 
bloody future for any such system”. When the Kurds increased their 
preassure on the USA and Iraqi central goverment to implement Article 58 of 
the Transitional Administrative Law, which related to Kirkuk in October 
2004, “Turkey spoke of possibly sending troops into northern Iraq, warning 
that its forces could reach Kirkuk within 18 hours” (Rafaat, 2007: 81). 
 Within this period, PKK terror intensified again and kept its place 
among Turkey’s national security problems. After the PKK camps in Syria 
were shut down, the organization entered a period of recovery in Northern 
Iraq. The new members who joined the organization were trained in various 
places, mainly Kandil mountain and Mahur camp. On the other hand, the 
organization which took hold of some of the arms from Saddam army 
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prepared to make new actions. PKK broke the cease fire it had declared 
before in 2004 and speeded up terrorist attacks. During 1990s, a total of 27 
operations, some of which were hot pursuits, air attacks while some of which 
were extensive such as Steel Operation (1995), Hammer Operation (1997) 
and Dawn Operation (1997) (Aljazeera, 2011, 19 October). However, no 
extensive operation was undertaken to the area from the aftermath of the 
invasion until 2007. After the Süleymaniye incident, Turkish Army Forces 
(TAF) could not launch operations to Northern Iraq without the approval of 
the USA, except for hot pursuits to terrorists who attacked within the country 
(Brannen, 2007). Although negotiations were made with Washington and 
Baghdad on this, no satisfactory results were taken. Methods except 
intervention were proposed in the negotiations. In negotiations of the 
authorities of national intelligence service of Turkey with KRGI, Barzani 
stated that they could cooperate about fighting PKK in the event of “KRGI 
being recognized by Ankara”. Barzani obviously wanted Ankara to give up 
on its red lines. Among the other terms Barzani proposed, there was dual 
citizenship to Kurds on both sides of the border and cooperation between 
both parties in terms of the fields of education, health and economy. When 
these terms were not accepted by Ankara, Ankara Erbil relations, which were 
already tense because of Kirkuk issue began to get worse (Uzgel, 2013: 285). 
Unlike 1990s, Kurdish leaders who got stronger with the alliance with the 
USA and who were armed by the USA began to challenge Turkey. In return, 
Ankara used harsh expressions for PUK. In response to Turkey’s persistence 
in operations during 2006 and 2007 when PKK had increased their activities, 
Talabani said “we won’t hand over even a cat to Turkey”, while Barzani 
stated that “they would not call PKK a terrorist organization, they might call 
PKK a terrorist organizatiın if they did not respond to peace calls” and 
“they would use their right of self defence if Turkey makes a cross border 
operation attacks to the region” (Yeni Şafak, 2007, 22 October). Within this 
period, prime minister Erdoğan likened KRGI to a tribe state and said “I will 
not negotiate with a tribal leader” (Hürriyet, 2007, 6 June). 
 When the USA got into a rut in Iraq and started to include the sunnis 
in this country to the process, it needed Turkey’s help. Thus, the USA had to 
make concessions from some policies by remembering Turkey’s sensitivities 
about Iraq. Because of the agreement reached on 5 November 2007, Bush 
government gave the green light to Turkey’s operation demands despite 
Baghdad and Erbil (Uzgel, 2013: 289-290). Five air attacks were undertaken 
to Northern Iraq in 2007 December and 2008 January and February. On 21 
February 2008, the first ground operation of 2000s, Güneş Operation, was 
launched (Aljazeera, 2011, 19 October). However, this operation was both 
launched under hard winter conditions and also it lasted short, unlike the 
ones in 1990s.  
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 Other problems that emerged in the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey 
within this period were the issues of Kirkuk and Iraqi Turkmens. In Kirkuk, 
which is a mini version of Iraq, Arabs, Turkmens and Kurds live and each 
claim a right in this city. Right after the invasion, the plundering of deeds 
and register offices in this Kirkuk had caused a reaction from Turkey. 
Foreign Affairs minister Gül and chief of general staff Özkök reminded their 
American colleagues that the issues guaranteed were not fulfilled and stated 
that in the event of peshmergas’ activities in Kirkuk not being taken under 
control by American forces, TAF could enter Northern Iraq. These warnings 
of Turkey were effective in that period and later Kirkuk was taken under 
control by American forces (Taştekin, 2006: 275). Ankara made initiatives in 
the presence of Washington to act with coordination in Northern Iraq. 
However, Washington accepted “a group of Turkish military committee to 
make examinations in the region” (Uzgel, 2013: 279). Later, when 
Kurdification policy started in Kirkuk in 2004, Ankara discussed the issue 
with Kurdi politicians such as Foreign Affairs minister of Iraq, Hoşyar 
Zebari and Neçirvan Barzani. Kurdi politicians wanted Ankara not to 
interfere with the issue of Kirkuk any more in return of handing over Osman 
Öcalan to Turkey. However, when it was understood that Turkey would not 
make concessions to Kirkuk policy, Mesut Barzani stated that “they could 
fight if necessary” (İnternethaber, 2004, 19 September). When Mesut 
Barzani was later called to Ankara to make negotiations, he lightened his 
tone  (Milliyet, 2004, 12 October). In the following periods, Ankara opposed 
to “Kurdification policy” in Kirkuk and to this city’s being connected to 
KRGI. Ankara defended two theses about the issue of Kirkuk. The first one 
was that Kirkuk’s future had to be determined as a result of negotations 
between Kurds, Turkmens, Arabs and Asuris living in this city. Another 
thesis advocated by Turkey was the recommendation of “area with special 
status” which was one of the four recommendations prepared by UN’s Aid 
mission to Iraq (Uzgel, 2013: 281). Upon understanding that referendum 
after changing the ethnic structure in the region would serve Kurds, Sunni 
and Shiite Arabs as well as Turkmens in Iraq expressed their discomforts. As 
a conclusion, with the persistance of Turkey and Iraq central government and 
“probably because of the opposition of USA”, the referendum in Kirkuk was 
postponed (Uzgel, 2013: 279). 
 One of the red lines Turkey declared before the war was about the 
Turkmens in Iraq. Until the 90s, Turkey did not bring up the Turkmen issue 
not to interfere with the internal affairs of Iraq. However, after the Gulf War, 
with the decline in of Saddam regime in the region, Ankara began to watch 
the Turkmen population in Northern Iraq closely. In 1995, Ankara brought 
together the 16 Turkmen organizations and pioneered the establishment of 
Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF). Turkmens are the third greatest elements in Iraq, 
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following Arabs and Kurds. According to their own claims, their population 
is around 3 million. However, they are not effective enough in Iraq political 
life. After the invasion, Turkmens were exposed to a lot of oppression and 
they were excluded from the restructuring process of Iraq. For example, in 
Iraq temporary administration of 25 people, there was only one Turkmen 
representative. On the other hand, American troops launched an operation to 
Tal Afar, where the Turkmens are densely populated, in 2004. Starting from 
2005, ITF could not show a significant success in elections in Iraq. The 
reason for this was the differences in religions, rather than the number of the 
population. Due to denominational differences, Shia and Sunni groups can 
act together with Kurd and Arab parties. Party alignments of ITF generally 
consists of Nationalist Sunni groups. Turkey had not made any demands for 
Turkmens about minority status and human rights. However, Turkey began 
to mention these after the invasion, made some interventions asking America 
to give Turkmens similar rights with Kurds; however, as stated before, 
“motion crisis” affected Turkmens, too (Uzgel, 2013: 279-280). 
 Within this period, the only subject Turkey showed success in 
Northern Iraq was the increase in economic and trade relations with the 
region. Turkey is the only neighboring country that connects Iraq to both 
Europe and Mediterranean. On the other hand, the country with the strongest 
economy among the neighbors of Iraq is Turkey. Since the relations of Syria 
and Iran, the other neighbors of Iraq, with America had problems 
Washington included Turkey to the restructuring process of Iraq. In 
November 2003, a memorandum of understanding was signed between 
Turkey and Iraq about economic cooperation. Later, Turkish firms also 
began to make use of the 18,6 billion dolar budget, which was given for the 
restructuring of Iraq. Thus, trading relations between Turkey and Iraq began 
to increase fast. While Turkey’s export to Iraq was 829 million dollars in 
2003, it became 2,845 billion dollars in 2007. The import, which was 113 
million dollars in 2003 became 645 million dollars in 2007 (Yeşilyurt, 2013: 
408). 
 
Cooperation-based Northern Iraq Policy Period (2008-2015) 
 Within the post-invasion period, Turkey kept political relations with 
KRGI to a minimum level. However, Turkey had influenced the area 
economically. Northern Iraq’s relations with the outer world occured by way 
of Turkey. The primary reason why Ankara had limited relations with KRGI 
was the concern that the “loose federal” structuring would cause break-ups in 
the future. However, Ankara began to see federalism as the healthiest way to 
maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq. This difference in approach was also 
reflected in the Northern Iraq policy of Turkey (Kılıç, 2010: 249). Turkey’s 
Northern Iraq policy, which was executed by Special Forces since 1996, 
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began to be determined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after 2007  
(Uzgel, 2013: 290). The decreasing effects of military burocracy  in foreign 
policy can be seen as one of the differences in politics. The government 
increased its initiative in home and foreign policy and started policies such as 
“democratic initiative” and “resolution process”. Within this period, the 
increase in political relations with KRGI was a development in parallel with 
the aforementioned policies. On the other hand, the news that the USA 
would retreat from Iraq affected Ankara KRGI relations. With the USA 
retreating from Iraq, Turkey would not come face to face with American 
powers in operations to the area or the policies to be followed to the region. 
Thus, Ankara could develop its relations with KRGI and form “sphere of 
influence” in the region again. KRGI would no longer have the opportunity 
to stack on Ankara depending on Washington. In addition, Erbil, which was 
not in good relations with Ankara, would not be able to move freely in the 
area. In a sense, with the retreat of USA from the region, Ankara and Erbil 
“would be alone with their fate” in the area. On the other hand, in the event 
of opposing Ankara, Erbil, which already had bad relations with Baghdad, 
could have more problems in the area. Antoher reason for Ankara KRGI 
convergence can be the influence of Iran in governments established after 
Saddam. As a response to the increasing influence of Iran on Iraq, Turkey 
headed towards KRGI.  
 2008 was a turning point in Turkey-KRGI relations. In the NSC on 
24 April 2008, a decision was taken that “it was suitable for Turkey’s 
interests to have relations with Iraqi groups and actors”  (Balcı, 2014: 10-
11). The first direct contact between Turkey and PUK occured with the 
meeting between Turkey’s Iraq special representative Murat Özçelik, Prime 
Ministry Foreign Affairs Chief Advisor Ahmet Davutoğlu and KRGI Prime 
Minister Neçirvan Barzani. Davutoğlu adviced N. Barzani to leave disputed 
issues aside and to speak about how both parties could cooperate in 
economic and political areas, including the solution to terror problem (except 
military methods) (Charountaki, 2012:192). In fact, this offer showed that 
Ankara was experiencing a transformation about both fighting PKK and 
Northern Iraq policy. As a result of this, different from previous Turkey 
KFGI relations, during the period after 2008, Türkiye-KRGI relations had a 
“legal, direct and institutionalized” structure and thus, the third phase started 
in bilateral relations  (Charountaki, 2012: 190-191). 
 Due to these developments, Turkey’s national security based foreign 
policy partly remained in the background which was replaced by economic 
cooperation priviliged foreign policy (Erkmen, 2015: 173). During prime 
minister Erdoğan’s official visit to Baghdad in July 2008, the agreements 
between the two countries also show the changes in policy. During this visit, 
a decision was made to establish Turkey-Iraq High Level Strategic 
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Cooperation Council, in which ministers of internal affairs, foreign affairs, 
energy and trade would take part. In addition, agreements were made to build 
a pipeline for Iraq natural gas, to increase the capacity of Kirkuk Yumurtalik 
pipeline and to open new border check-points as well as cooperations in the 
area of energy. In addition, agreements were also made on security. In 
November 2008, Trilateral Mechanism to fight terrorism was established 
between Turkey, Iraq and the USA (Uzgel, 2013: 292)5. These agreements 
show that Turkey was continuing its Northern Iraq policy over Baghdad. 
During his official visit to Baghdad in March 2009, president Gül met KRGI 
prime minister Neçirvan Barzani. This development was interpreted as 
Ankara “recognizing” KRGI. Ankara had left its policy of not negotiating 
with Kurd politicians from Northern Iraq. In the October of the same year, 
during the official visit of Erdoğan to Iraq, consulates of Turkish republic 
were opened in Musul, Erbil and Basra (Uzgel, 2013: 292). 
 Turkey KRGI trading relations focused on areas such as energy, 
construction and infrastructure. KRGI’s incusion in the energy marketing 
made Ankara and Erbil closer and caused Turkey to catch three important 
chances in the field of energy. These were cheaper prices in the field of 
energy, getting rid of being dependent on some countries in energy import 
since the enegy resources became varied and becoming an energy transfer 
center which connected energy rich the Middle East and the Caucasus with 
Europe that was experiencing energy deficits  (Balcı, 2014: 17). At this 
point, Turkey had a key actor role in integrating Northern Iraq economy with 
international markets. While the amount of daily raw oil carried with Kirkuk-
Yumurtalik pipleine was around 133.000 barrels in 2010, this amount rose 
up to more than 147.000 barrels in 2011 (İnan, 2013: 82). In January 2015, 
minister of energy and natural resources Taner Yıldız stated that the oil flow 
from Northern Iraq had become as daily 450.000 barrels (Anadolu Ajansı, 
2015, 14 January). In 2015, the oil shipping from Northern Iraq had 
increased almost four times when compared with 2014 (Milliyet, 2016, 26 
January). Some agreements were made between Turkey and KRGI in the 
field of energy. One of the most important of these agreements was the 
construction of the energy corridor that would combine Northern Iraq oil and 
natural gas with Kirkuk-Yumurtali pipeline. The construction of this corridor 
had started after the negotiations between USA, Turkey, Iraq and KRGI  
(Dünya Bülteni, 2013, 28 November). However, agreements between Turkey 
and KRGI on the field of energy which excluded Iraq Central Government 
caused tension in Ankara Baghdad relations. While Ankara claimed that a 
great number of countries made similar activities in the various places of 
Iraq, Baghdad stated that “every agreement signed without the approval of 
                                                          
5 For Iraqi based secrity problems for Turkey see.(Akbaş, 2012: 328-329)  
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central government was illegal” (Enerji Enstitüsü, 2013, 15 May). This 
situation also caused problems in Ankara Washington relations. Washington 
was worried that the political structure in Iraq would break more and 
Washington Baghdad relations would deteriorate (Hürriyet, 2013, 25 
February). 
Table 1. Export-Import data between Turkey and Iraq between 2003 and 2012 (1000 
dollars)  
Year Export Import 
2003 829.058 41.656 
2004 1.820.802 145.575 
2005 2.750.080 66.434 
2006 2.589.352 121.745 
2007 2.844.767 118.702 
2008 3.916.685 133.056 
2009 5.123.406 120.558 
2010 6.036.362 153.476 
2011 8.310.129 86.753 
2012 10.822.503 149.328 
Resource: TSI (Erkmen, 2015: 185-186). 
 
 It was stated in Minister of Economy Zafer Çağlayan’s remarks about 
export-import numbers in 2012 that the part of commercial relations between 
KRGI and Turkey was about 70% as shown by the numbers in the table 
above (Erkmen, 2015: 191). As can be seen, a sharp increase was 
experienced in Turkey’s export to the area especially in and after 2008. It is 
possible to explain this change with developments in both home policy of 
Turkey and also with development summarized above. As for 2014, KRGI 
both became the most important energy partner of Ankara and became the 
actor that enabled a smooth relation with Ankara (Öğür et al. 2014: 52). On 
the other hand, during the restructuring of the region, meeting the 
infrastructure and superstructure needs, Turkey private sector had an 
important part. During the restructuring process, the fact that Turkish private 
sector firms are the most dominant economic power in the region increases 
KRGI’s economic dependence on Turkey. As for 2013, Turkish firms make 
up 75% of the construction sector while they make up 10% of the energy 
sector (Üstün, 2013: 2).  
 KRGI’s import products from construction products to electronic 
devices and basic food are provided by Turkey. The number of trucks 
passing from Habur increasing four times in 3 months startign from 2009 is 
significant in terms of showing the fast increase in trading relations (Erkmen, 
2015: 177). The momentum gained by the volume of trade developed in 
especially oil, gas, construction and infrastructure has caused economic 
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dependency. Turkey-KRGI relations did not develop only in terms of 
economy. Thanks to advancements in economy, bilateral relations expanded 
recently to cover political and even defense dimensions. Ankara’s 
agreements with KRGI caused opposition between PKK and KDP-PUK 
block (Öğür et al. 2014: 48). According to the agreements, KRGI shut its 
PKK camps in Northern Iraq, began to pressurize Mahur camp, called for 
PKK to lay down arms and even announced PKK a terrorist organization, 
although they denied this later (Uzgel, 2013: 291). In terms of security 
mechanism, bilateral mechanism (Turkey and KRGI) became more 
important for Turkey and Turkey and KRGI agreed on the establishment of 
an operation center in Erbil (Erkmen, 2015: 177). Cross-border operations 
are still being made to Northern Iraq, although not as much as 90s. 
Peshmergas also joined the operations in 90s from time to time. Peshmergas 
do not support the operations made today, however, operations are launched 
with the approval of KRGI. However, Iraq government began to oppose to 
Turkey’s operations this time (Sputniknews, 2012, 3 October). In 2011 and 
2012, Turkey launched cross-border air attacks on PKK camps in Northern 
Iraq. Again on 19 October 2011, TAF started a hot pursuit to catch the PKK 
members who ran away after an attack in Hakkâri and entered four 
kilometers inside Northern Iraq and fought the members of the organization 
here (Karar, 2015, 25 July). Although these operations were paused during 
the resolution process, in July 2015 when the armed fighting with PKK 
restarted, air operation was launched in the area in (İnternethaber, 2015, 24 
July), while ground operation was launched in October (NTV, 2015, 14 
October). This situation shows that Turkey can intervene to the region as 
long as relations with KRGI do not worsen.  
 The ILS threat that emerged recently is another factor that caused the 
development of military relations between Ankara and Erbil. In October 
2014 when ILS advanced to Kobani, Turkey opened a corridor to let 
Peshmerga forces to move to the area where fights were taking place over 
Turkey  (DW, 2014, 20 October). In 2014, during the official visit to Iraq, 
prime minister Davutoğlu went to Northern Iraq and  went to peshmerga 
training camp here. Here he said “we will fight shoulder to shoulder” 
(against terrorists) and showed that there was cooperation between Turkey 
and KRGI (Haberler, 2014, 21 November). In addition, Turkey supported 
Peshmerga with arms (İdiz, 2014). Against the threat of ILS starting a new 
attack on Northern Iraq, a special team of 2000 soldiers of TAF were sent to 
Başika camp of KRGI. The team’s official duty was to train peshmergas 
(Ergan, 2015, 5 December). However, sending Turkish soldiers to Başika 
disturbed Baghdad (BBC, 2015, 30 December). In addition, with ILS 
increasing its influence in the region, USA began to approach PKK 
differently (Akbaş, 2015: 152). On the other hand, Ankara remains silent 
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against Barzani’s statements about independence. Countries in the region 
such as Egypt and Iran opposed to KRGI’s statements about independence. 
Prime minister Erdoğan told Barzani “not to hurry up” and adviced him “to 
support political balances that will maintain the integrity of the country” 
(T24, 2014, 15 July). 
 
Conclusion 
 It is possible to talk about a great number of factors that affect 
Turkey’s Northern Iraq policy. Some of these are Turkey’s historical ties and 
economic and commercial relations with the area, Turkmen population in the 
region and Northern Iraq’s geopolitical position. Since the Gulf  War, 
Turkey’s Northern Iraq policy has been shaped in accordance with “security” 
parameters. The red lines declared before Iraq’s invasion were the 
formulation of Turkey’s security worries. However, the developments in 
Turkey and Iraq following the invasion have caused the transition from a 
security based policy to economic cooperation based policy in bilateral 
relations. It can be seen that Turkey’s Northern Iraq policy underwent a big 
transition especially after 2008. First, security based foreign policy called 
high politics by realist movement changed into the line advocated by mutual 
dependency theorists. It is possible to evalaute this change as transition to 
“win win” model from “zero sum game” model. Within the process, both 
Ankara and Erbil succeeded in cooperating in some areas including security 
issues due to the gains in economic area.  
 However, it can be seen that vital subjects for both actors were 
shelved. However, there is no guarantee that these issues won’t come up 
again in the future. For example, Ankara did not ever mention giving up the 
“red lines” emphasized before the invasion of Iraq. Thus, it is not known for 
sure how Ankara will take KRGI’s declaration of independence. On the other 
hand, it is another problem that KRGI claims right on controversial land. 
How will Turkey react if the areas densely populated by Turkmens such as 
Mosul and Kirkuk are included under the sovereignty of KRGI? The point 
that has to be made is that during the time that has passed from the pre-
invasion period to our day, the balances in Iraq has taken a quite different 
form. Turkey is worried that Iran has turned Iraq into its domain. Thus, 
Turkey may not oppose to Turkmen’s living under the sovereignty of KRGI 
in the case of basic rights being guaranteed. However, it is not clear what 
kind of a course Ankara Baghdad relations will take under such a 
circumstance.  
 Ankara tried to manage its relations with KRGI until 2010 by taking 
Baghdad into consideration. Until this date, Ankara Erbil relations had been 
managed through Baghdad. However, recent developments such as 
agreements between KRGI and Ankara in the field of energy, Turkey’s 
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training peshmergas and having soldiers in Northern Iraq have disturbed 
Baghdad. In addition to these, KRGI’s independence goal, its goals about 
Mosul and Kirkuk and KRGI’s activities in the field of energy have 
disturbed Baghdad. These problems can cause war between Baghdad and 
Erbil in the following years. In the case of Iraq central government getting 
stronger, it is possible for this government to head towards policies that will 
ensure the continuity of the country’s territorial integrity. In case of a fight 
and in case of this fight ending in favor of KRGI, Ankara will face its red 
lines again while in case of a result in favor of central Iraq government, 
Ankara will be deprived of its economical gains. In addition, Turkey’s being 
close with KRGI does not disturb only Baghdad. Middle East countries 
except Israel advocate Iraq’s territorial integrity. Thus, Turkey’s KRGI 
policy can influence the bilateral relations of Turkey with some of the 
countries in the region, mainly Iran.  
 Another issue that might be a problem in Turkey KRGI relations in 
the long run is the Syria crisis. Turkey supports the Free Syria Army and 
Bayır Bucak Turkmens in Syria, while PUK supports Syria Kurds. Recently, 
Ankara’s relations with Syria Kurds have deteriorated and has warned this 
group not to move to the west of Fırat river. This situation was even declared 
as “red line”. If Ankara’s relations with Syria Kurds deteriorate, this 
situation can be reflected in Turkey PUK relations. Besides all these, it is 
possible for both actors to solve the aforementioned problems through 
compromise by highlighting economic cooperation gains.  
 
References: 
1. Akbaş, Zafer (2015) “İkinci Körfez savaşından Günümüze Irak: 
Aktörler ile Çıkar Çatışmalrının Analizi” Ed. Esra Pakin 
Albayrakoğlu, Ertan Efegil, Türkiye’nin Yakın Havzasındaki Devlet-
İçi Çatışmaların Analizleri, pp.. 139-172, İstanbul: Gündoğan 
Yayınları.  
2. Akbaş, Zafer (2012) ““Devlet İnşa Sürecinde Terörle Mücadele 
Sorunu: Irak Örneği ve Türkiye’ye Etkileri”,The Journal of Academic 
Social Science Studies, ss. 319-332, 5(4). 
3. Aljazeera (2011). “TAF'nın sınır ötesi 
operasyonları”,http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/TAFnin-sinir-otesi-
operasyonlari, (19.10.2011), (retrieved, 12.12.2015). 
4. Altunışık, Meliha Benli (2000). “Güvenlik Kıskacında Türkiye-Orta 
Doğu İlişkileri”. En Uzun On Yıl: Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış 
Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar. Ed. G. Özcan, Ş. Kut. Ankara: 
Büke Publishing House, 2nd Print, pp. 329-353. 
5. Anadolu Ajansı (2015). “Kuzey Irak’tan ham petrol akışında 37 
milyon varile ulaştık”, http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/450023--
European Scientific Journal January 2017 edition vol.13, No.2 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
31  
kuzey-iraktan-ham-petrol-akisinda-37-milyon-varile-ulastik, 
(14.01.2015), (retrieved, 12.12.2015). 
6. Avcı, Erkan. (2014). “2003 ABD’nin Irak’ı İşgali Sonrası 
Türkiye’nin Irak Politikası ve PKK Sorunu (2003-2013)”, 
Uluslararası Stratejik Bakış Enstitüsü, 
http://usbed.org/yayinlar/T%C3%BCrkiyenin_Irak_Politikas%C4%B
1_ve_PKK_Sorunu.pdfs(retrieved 12 10.2015) pp.. 1-19. 
7. Bakan, Zerrin Ayşe (2007). “Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Yeni Güvenlik 
Teorileri ve Türkiye’nin Güvenlik Algılamaları”, 21. Yüz Yıl,ss. pp. 
35-50, October December. 
8. Balcı, Ali (2014). “Enerji’sine Kavuşan Komşuluk Türkiye-
Kürdistan Bölgesel Yönetimi İlişkileri”, Seta, 97, pp.. 1-28. 
9. Baylis, John (2008). “Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güvenlik Kavramı”, 
Uluslararası İlişkiler, 5 (18), pp. 69-85. 
10. BBC (2015). “Irak: Türkiye askerlerin çekilmesi yönündeki 
anlaşmaya uymadı”, http://www.bbc.com/ turkce/haberler/  
2015/12/151230_irak_turkiye, (30.12.2015), (retrieved, 12.02.2016). 
11. Brannen, Samuel (2007). “Turkish Airstrikes in Northern Iraq”, 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071219_cq_brannen_turkey.pdf, 
(19.12.2007), (retrieved, 12.12.2015). 
12. Canbolat, İbrahim (2002). Avrupa Birliği: Uluslarüstü Bir Sistemin 
Tarihsel, Teorik, Kurumsal, Jeopolitik Analizi ve Genişleme 
Sürecinde Türkiye ile İlişkiler. 3rd Print, Bursa: Alfa Publishing 
House. 
13. Canestaro, Nathan A. (2007). “Realism and 
Transnationalism:CompetingVisions for International Security”, 
Boston University International Law Journal,Vol: 25, pp. 113-162. 
14. Charountaki, Marianna (2012). "Turkish Foreign Policy and the 
Kurdistan Regiona lGovernment". Perceptions, 18 (4), 185-208. 
15. Dünya Bülteni (2013). “Petrol anlaşması Maliki'nin gelişine kaldı”. 
http://www.dunyabulteni.net/haber/281554/petrol-anlasmasi-
malikinin-gelisine-kaldi, (28.11.2013), (retrieved, 12.12.2015). 
16. DW (2014). “Türkiye'den Peşmerge'ye Kobani izni”. 
http://www.dw.com/tr/t%C3%BCrkiyeden-pe%C5%9Fmergeye-
kobani-izni/a-18007828, (20.10.2014), (retrieved, 12.12.2015). 
17. Enerji Enstitüsü (2013). “Türk-Kürt petrol anlaşması Irak’ı kızdırdı”. 
http://enerjienstitusu.com/2013/05/15/turk-kurt-petrol-anlasmasi-
iraki-kizdirdi-2/, (15.05.2013), (retrieved, 12.12.2015). 
18. Eralp, Atila (2000), “Uluslararsı İlişkiler Disiplinin Oluşumu: 
İdealizm Realizm Tartışması”, Ed. Atila Eralp, Devlet, Sistem ve 
Kimlik: Uluslarası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar, pp. 57-89, İstanbul, 
İletişim Publishing House, 3rd Print. 
European Scientific Journal January 2017 edition vol.13, No.2 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
32 
19. Ergan, Uğur (2015). “Kuzey Irak’ta 2 bin Türk askeri”, Hürriyet 
,http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kuzey-irakta-2-bin-turk-askeri-
40023349, (05.12.2015), (retrieved, 12.12.2015). 
20. Erkmen, Serhat (2015). “İç Etkenler Açısından Türkiye’nin Kuzey 
Irak Politikasının Dönüşümü”. Bilig, 72, pp. 171-196. 
21. Haberler (2014). “Davutoğlu, Peşmerge Eğitim Kampını Ziyaret 
Etti”. http://www.haberler.com/davutoglu-pesmerge-egitim-kampini-
ziyaret-etti-6709237-haberi/,  
22. ( 21.11.2014) (retrieved 10.11.2015). 
23. Hürriyet (2003). “Dilerim dostlarımız bize muhtaç olmazlar”. 
http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/03/27/ 267341.asp, 
(27.03.2003). 
24. Hürriyet (2007). “Erdoğan: Kabile reisi ile görüşmem”. 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-kabile-reisi-ile-gorusmem-
6662036, (06.06.2007). (retrieved 10.11.2015). 
25. Hürriyet (2013). “Irak bölünmesin ama”. 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/irak-bolunmesin-ama-22676015, 
(25.02.2013), (retrieved 10.11.2015). 
26. İdiz, Semih (2014). “Ankara ve Bağdat ilişkilerde temiz sayfa 
açıyor”. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/ 2014/11 
/turkey-iraq-new-page-davutoglu-visit.htm. (retrieved 10.11.2015). 
27. İnan, Aybüke (2013). “Kerkük-Yumurtalık Petrol Boru Hattı ve 
Türkiye Irak İlişkileri (1973-2011)”. Ortadoğu Analiz, 5(56), pp. 68-
85. 
28. İnternethaber (2004). “Barzani'den ahlaksız teklif”. 
http://www.internethaber.com/barzaniden-ahlaksiz-teklif-
1088289h.htm, (19.09.2004), (retrieved 10.11.2015). 
29. İnternethaber (2015). “PKK operasyonu! Türkiye bombaladı!”. 
http://www.internethaber.com/pkk-operasyonu-turkiye-bombaladi-
803282h.htm, (24.07.2015), (retrieved 10.11.2015). 
30. Karar (2015). “Türkiye 3 yıl sonra ilk kez PKK'ya sınır ötesi 
operasyon yaptı”. http://www.karar.com/gundem-haberleri/turkiye-3-
yil-sonra-ilk-kez-pkkya-sinir-otesi-operasyon-yapti-gun-gun-sinir-
otesi-operasyonlar, (25.07.2015), (retrieved 10.11.2015). 
31. Kılıç, Kutbettin (2010). “Kuzey Irak: Bir Etnik Sorunun Arkeolojisi” 
Ed. Kemal İ., Burhanettin D. and Muhittin A., Dünya Çatışmaları: 
Çatışma Bölgeleri ve Konuları. Vol I, pp. 223-255, Ankara: Nobel 
Publishing House. 
32. Mearsheimer, John J. (2002). “Realism Real World andthe 
Academy”, in Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey, eds., Realism 
and Institutionalism in International Studies (AnnArbor: 
TheUniversity of Michigan Press, 2002), 
European Scientific Journal January 2017 edition vol.13, No.2 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
33  
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0029.pdf   pp. 23-33, 
(retrieved 10.11.2015). 
33. Milliyet (2004). “Barzani: Fırça için Ankara’ya çağrıldım”. 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/barzani--firca-icin-
ankarayacagrildim/siyaset/ haber detay arsiv/12.10.2004/ 
90975/default.htm, (12.10.2004), (retrieved 10.11.2015). 
34. Milliyet (2016). “Irak'tan Türkiye'ye petrol sevkiyatında rekor artış”. 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/irak-tan-turkiye-ye-petrol/ekonomi/ 
detay/2184613 /default. htm, (26.01.2016), (retrieved 15.02.2016). 
35. NTV (2015). “Kuzey Irak'ta sızma operasyonu”, 
http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/kuzey-irakta-sizma-perasyonu, 
U1m7bwbjn0CANwVegwfmzQ?_ref=infinite, (14.10.2015). 
36. Öğür, Berkan, Baykal, Zana and Balcı, Ali (2014). “Kuzey Irak-
Türkiye İlişkileri: PKK, Güvenlik ve İşbirliği”. Ortadoğu 
Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1, http://ormer.sakarya.edu.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/rapor-film-net-1.pdf. (retrieved 11.09.2015). 
37. Park, Bill (2004). “Iraq’s Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for US 
Policy”, Parameters, pp.. 18-30. 
38. Rafaat, Aram (2007) “U.S. –Kurdish Relations in Post-Invasion 
Iraq”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 11 (4 ) December.  
39. Rana, W. (2015). “Theory of ComplexInterdependence: A 
Comparative Analysis of Realist and Neoliberal Thoughts”, 
International Journal of Business and Socia lScience, 6 (2), pp. 290-
297. 
40. Robin Mills (2016), Under the Mountains: Kurdish Oil and Regional 
Politics, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Kurdish-Oil-and-Regional-Politics-WPM-
63.pdf (retrieved 10.11.2016). 
41. Sancak, Kadir “Güvenlik Kavramı Etrafındaki Tartışmalar ve 
Uluslararası Güvenliğin Dönüşümü”, Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi,  
http://www.ktu.edu.tr/dosyalar/sbedergisi_69519.pdf pp. 123-134 
(retrieved 07.10.2015) 
42. Sputniknews (2012). “Irak'tan "askeri üssü boşaltın"resti”. 
http://tr.sputniknews.com/rsfmradio. com/2012 _10_03 /Irak-Turk-
uslerini-kapatmak-istiyor/, (03.10.2012), (retrieved 11.09.2015). 
43. Şahin, Mehmet (2006). “2003 Irak Savaşı ve Iraklı Kürtler”. II. 
Körfez Savaşı. Ed. M. Şahin and M. Taştekin. Ankara: Platin Press, 
pp. 283-305. 
44. Tanrısever, Oktay F. (2005). “Güvenlik”, Ed. Atila Eralp, Devlet ve 
Ötesi: Uluslarası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar, pp. 107-125, İstanbul, 
İletişim Publishing House.  
European Scientific Journal January 2017 edition vol.13, No.2 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
34 
45. Taştekin, Mesut (2006). "Türk Dış Politikasında 2003 Irak Savaşı”.II. 
Körfez Savaşı.Ed. M. Şahin and M. Taştekin. Ankara: Platin Press,  
pp. 245-282. 
46. Tellis, Ashley J. (2006-07). “Trade, Interdependence, and Security in 
Asia”, Strategic Asia, 
http://nbr.org/publications/strategic_asia/pdf/SA06_Tellis.pdf. pp.3-
25. (retrieved 11.09.2015). 
47. Tür, Özlem (2012). " Türkiye’nin Irak ve Suriye İlişkileri”. XXI. 
Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi. Eds. F. Sönmezoğlu et al., 
İstanbul: Der Press,.pp. 593-615. 
48. T24 (2014). “Erdoğan'dan Barzani'ye: Bağımsız Kürdistan için acele 
etmeyin”. http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogandan-barzaniye-bagimsiz-
kurdistan-icin-acele-etmeyin, 264373, (15.07.2014), (retrieved 
11.09.2015). 
49. Uzgel, İlhan (2013). “ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler” Ed. B. Oran, Türk 
Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, 
Yorumlar, Vol III: 2001-2012, İletişim Publishing House, 2nd Print, 
pp 249-337. 
50. Üstün, Nazlı (2013). “Türkiye-Kuzey Irak İlişkileri ve Ekonomik 
Yansımaları”. Konya Ticaret Odası, pp. 1-12, 
http://www.kto.org.tr/d/file/turkiye-%E2%80%93-kuzey-irak-
iliskileri-ve-ekonomik-yansimalari.pdf. (retrieved 11.09.2015). 
51. Voller, Yaniv (2012). From Rebellion to De Facto Statehood: 
International and Transnational Sources of The Transformation of 
The Kurdish National Liberation Movement in Iraq Into The 
Kurdistan Regional Government. Phd Thesis. London: London 
School of Economics and Political Science. 
52. Yeni Şafak (2007). “Türkiye'ye bir kedi bile teslim etmeyiz”. 
http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/turkiyeye-bir-kedi-bile-teslim-
etmeyiz-76356, (22.10.2007) (retrieved 11.09.2015). 
53. Yeşilyurt, Nuri (2013). “Orta Doğuyla İlişkiler” Ed. B. Oran, Türk 
Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, 
Yorumlar, Vol III: 2001-2012, İletişim Publishing House, 2nd Print, 
pp 401-403.  
 
European Scientific Journal January 2017 edition vol.13, No.2 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
35  
 
Figure 1: Political and military boundaries of the Kurdish region of Iraq (as of April 2015), 
(Mills, 2016: 5) 
 
Figure 2: KRI oil and gas infrastructure (Mills, 2016: 22) 
  
